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A very important decision showing the opinion of the court of last
resort of that circuit has been recently handed down by the United
States Circuit Court of Appeals in the case of Rotins et a. v. Oxley
Stave Co., 83 Fed. Rep. 912. Although not unanimous, it is of greaL
value in deciding that question, which is nearly always the basis of
the action of conspiracy and concerning which the courts are hope-
lessly in conflict, whether an act lawful for an individual can become
a conspiracy when done by several. The plaintiff below was a cor-
poration engaged in the manufacture of casks and barrels, used
mainly to pack flour, meat or provisions in. Some of their product
was hooped by hand, while an automatic hooping machine was used
upon the remainder, thereby greatly decreasing the cost. The de-
fendants were several private persons and two labor associations,
having branches throughout the United States and Europe; who
demanded that the corporation cease the use of such hooping
machine, and gave notice that if their request was not acceded to
they would immediately notify the company's customers not to buy
barrels so hooped, and would induce the members of all labor
organizations throughout the country not to purchase provisions or
other commodities packed in such barrels. To prevent such notifica-
tion an injunction was prayed for, it being claimed that the damages
otherwise resulting would be irreparable. Two of the cases mainly
relied upon by the defendants-ogul Steamship Co. v. !fcGregor. 23
Q. B. Diy. 598, and Continental Ins. Co. v. Board of Fire Underwriters
of the Pacific, 67 Fed. Rep. 3o-were simply cases of lawful competi-
tion in trade. The third case brought forward was Boahn Mfg. Co. v.
Hollis, 54 Minn. 223; 55 N. W. ii9, in which it was decided that
members of an association might voluntarily refuse to purchase from
whomsoever they will, and in commenting thereon this court said:
"We are not able to concede, however, that it is.always the case that
what one person may do without rendering himself liable to an action
many persons may enter into a combination to do. It has been held
in several well-considered cases that the law will sometimes take
cognizance of acts done by a combination which would not give rise
to a cause of action if committed by a single individual, since there
is a power in numbers, when acting in concert, to inflict injury,
which does not reside in persons acting separately. But if we con-
cede that the reasoning employed in Mfg. Co. v. Hollis was sound, as
applied to the facts in that case, yet it by no means follows that the
members of the association would have had the power to combine for
the purpose of compelling other persons, not members of the associa-
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tion, to withhold their patronage from a wholesale dealer who failea
to conduct his business in the mode prescribed by the association."
The dissenting opinion of Judge Caldwell, while very strong,
loses much of its force from his failure to see that although the
defendants had no intention of resorting to personal violence, they
nevertheless, quoting from Judge Thayer, expected, "By concerted
action, force of numbers, and by exciting the fears of the timid, to
compel many persons to surrender their freedom of. action and sub-
mit to the dictation of others in the management of their private
business affairs." Also the public would thereby be deprived of
the use of a valuable invention.
We are indebted to Judge Townsend of the United States Dis-
trict Court for Connecticut for his decision (not yet reported) in U.
S. v. Iselin &- Co. The question at issue was whether the law will
regard fractions of a day when it is necessary in order to determine
conflicting rights. The Dingley tariff law was signed by President
McKinley at six minutes past four on July 24, 1897. The steamship
Paris landed at her dock in the forenoon and these importations were
entered for consumption before 4 o'clock of that same day. The
Collector assessed the import duties and an additional duty for under-
valuation according to the provisions of this Dingley law, while the
importers claimed that the goods should be assessed according to the
lower rates under the old Wilson law. The opinion of Judge Town-
send relies entirely upon the decision of the United States General
Appraisers, who (Henderson M. Somerville giving the decision) decide
the question principally upon two grounds. The different sections of
the act in referring to the time when duties shall be levied, etc., use
the phrases, "on and after the passage of this act." or "on and after
the day when this act shall go into effect"; and the section repealing
existing laws provides that the repeal "shall not affect any act done.
or any right accruing or accrued * * * before the said repeal or
modification; but all rights and liabilities under said laws shall con-
tinue and may be enforced in the same manner as if said repeal or
modification had not been made." There- can be no question
from the first two phrases that the law took effect on the day
of its approval by the President (Arnold v. U. S., 9 Cranch. io4),
and, according to the old common law rule that fractions of a
day are not recognized, from the earliest moment of that day.
But so long ago as Lord Mansfield's time, in Combe v. Pitt, 3
Burr. R. 1423, 1434, it was said, "though the law does not, in
general, allow of the fraction of a day, yet it admits it in cases
where it is necessary to distinguish." And in Louisville v. Sav-
ings Bank, 104 U. S. 469, 478, Justice Harlan says, "it can not be
doubted that the Court may, when substantial justice requires it, ascer-
tain the precise hour when a statute took effect by the approval of
the Executive." Furthermore, the Constitution of the United States,
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Article I., Section 7, provides that "Every bill shall take effect as a
law from the time of its approval by the President;" and Judge Story
In re Richardson, 2 Story 571, 580, said in construing this clause:
"'It is the act of approval which makes it a law, and, until that act is
done, it is not a law, * * * for the general rule is, Lex jrosit.
non respicit. The law prescribes a rule for the future, not for the
past." The general principle may therefore be stated as follows:
That where there is no necessity to look into the fractions of a day
the old rule will be applied of relation back to the earliest moment of
the day (U. S. v. -Norton, 97 U. S. 164); but where special circum-
stances render it necessary to regard the exact moments of time when
two acts were done in order to adjust conflicting rights arising
thereunder, then the old rule will be disregarded and courts will
admit evidence to show which had priority in point of fact
(Burgess v. Salnon. 97 U. S. 381, where an act increasing the
internal revenue tax on tobacco but providing that the increase
should "not apply to tobacco on which the tax under existing
laws shall have been paid when this act takes effect," was held
not to apply to tobacco, the tax on which had been paid the
same day the act was signed, but a few hours before). The second
ground was that the section providing for an additional duty, where
the appraised value exceeds the value declared in the entry, must be
judicially construed as penal and therefore cannot be considered as
retroactive even for one moment. And as Judge Hughes in Hancock
v. Burgess, 1 Hughes 356, said: "If, as to its penal features, it can-
not be held to have gone into effect until 9 P. M. of the day of its
enactment, neither can it be held to have gone into effect before that
hour as to its other provisions."
We are also indebted to Judge Townsend for his decision (as yet
unreported) in Af.Prris ZEbress Co. v. U. S., where, against the testi-
mony of St. Gaudens, J. Q. A. Ward and other distinguished sculp-
tors, he decides that a tomb and reredos of dressed stone imported
for presentation to a church in Binghamton, N. Y., is a "work of art"
within the meaning of the tariff law admitting such free. It is ex-
ceedingly difficult to draw any line as to what is and what is not a
"work of art," for what appeals to one person's emotions and sense
of the beautiful may not to another's. St. Gaudens defined a "work
of art" as understood by artists to be only such a work as "is pro-
duced by a professional artist in his own studio, either wholly by him-
self or with such assistance as he needs, under his own immediate
direction and supervision." But all the sculptors admitted that if this
was not a work of art in sculpture it was a work of art in architecture
-in the broad sense, and in interpreting tariff acts, words are "to be
understood in the sense which they bear in the common speech of the
people." In this sense the altar and reredos must be considered a
"work of art"; it is "a skillful production of the beautiful in visible
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form." To hold that architectural works are not works of art would
exclude the famous churches and towers of Europe, the fountains of
Paris and Versailles.
It would seem in these more enlightened and refined days as if
any attempt to track criminals by bloodhounds or, at least, to convict
them by the testimony of bloodhounds, would be frowned upon by
Courts of Justice. But the Courts of Alabama have admitted such
testimony (Hodge v. State, 13 South. 385, and Simpson v. State, 20
South. 573), and in Pedigo v. Commonwealth, 44 S. W. 143, the
Supreme Court of Kentucky would have admitted the testimony if
certain instructions had been complied with. These instructions were
laid down as follows: That it must be established by the testimony
of some person who has personal knowledge of the fact, that this
particular dog has "acuteness of scent and power of discrimination,"
and "has been trained or tested in the tracking of human beings,"
and that the dog "was laid on the trail, whether visible or not, at a
point where the circumstances tend clearly to show that the guilty
party had been, or upon a track which such circumstances indicate to-
have been made by him." Apparently the court considers it in the
nature of expert testimony. But Judge Guffy very strongly dissents
and, according to our views, with all the weight of princille on his
side. He shows that the only cases in which such testimony is at all
reliable are those where the dog is set to track some hnown fugitive
or criminal, as a runaway slave, or a particular person accused of
crime. But when the dog is set to ferret out the unknown guilty man
from all the neighborhood (as here), how can it be shown that the
trail he picks up is that of the criminal, even granting that he is.
started at a point where the circumstances tend clearly to show that
the guilty party had been? If the point is on a highway, how many
others may have passed there since the crime? If not, in order to
obviate the possibility of the dog's following the wrong trail, must it
not first be shown that no one else has been near there since the
crime? The dog and not the person on the stand testifying to the
acts of the dog, is the real witness, and he can not be cross-examined.
It is really hearsay evidence-A is permitted to testify to what B (the
dog) told him.
